How very odd,
I mused, that my unconscious mind should call itself an Operator and call my
conscious mind a Thing.
Barbara O'Brien, Operators and Things.
Conclusion: The Subterranean Craftsman.
First
published in 1958, Barbara O’Brien’s Operators
and Things: The Inner Life of a
Schizophrenic is a fascinating lost classic in which a woman gives a
first-hand account of her sudden decent into schizophrenia and a complex
hallucinatory world dominated by hidden psychic controllers called the
Operators. It was first published in
hardback by a little known firm called Arlington Press, but gained wider
exposure as a paperback issued in 1960 by science fiction/pulp specialists Ace
Books. (The company were noted for their
two-for-the-price-of-one Ace Double
imprint, the format in which Burroughs’ debut Junkie first appeared, as well as several of Philip K. Dick’s
novels.) Ace published the memoir under
a “truth stranger than fiction” banner, in a style largely indisguishable from
its regular wheelhouse of pulp sci-fi.
This, however, was not entirely inapt, as the ambience of O’Brien’s
schizophrenic experience often evokes the monochrome surrealism of The Outer Limits, The Twilight Zone, and John Frankenheimer’s cult classic Seconds.
Operators was later
republished in the 70s, marketed with a mind to tap the post-60s boom for
alternative psychotherapies, particularly the anti-psychiatry movement
popularised by RD Laing. After that it
went off the publication radar for a couple of decades, finally re-emerging in
recent years with a small but enthusiastic cult following. Though a slim volume, the book was
fascinating to me for many reasons.
O’Brien’s invented world of Operators and Things evokes literary
precursors like Kafka and Burroughs; her story offers a sidelong glance into
the cold, alienating underbelly of office life during America’s golden age of
postwar stability and conformity; most intriguingly, the latter sections of the
book offer an extended meditation on themes which have been a lifelong personal
fascination: the relationship between the conscious and unconscious parts of
the brain, and the closely related mysteries of inspiration, intuition, and
creativity.
(I should note
that it is possible that Operators is
actually a work of fiction – that it is one of those trickster books which invent
a non-fictional frame almost in the manner of an allegory. It could be that some author invented
“Barbara O’Brien’s” story, in order to dramatize a critique of 50s corporate culture, and present his or her
speculative theories regarding the nature of schizophrenia and the
unconscious. I’m not really going to
address that possibility in the following essay, as I don’t have enough
information to speculate one way or the other, and the qualities of the book
remain undiminished regardless.) At the
beginning of her narrative, Barbara is a stable, capable, if perhaps a little
timid, professional woman working in the offices of the family-run Knox
Company. In a manner reminiscent of many
later alien abduction narratives, her life is abruptly thrown into disarray by
the appearance of a trio of strange figures at the foot of her bed:
I awoke one morning, during a time of great
personal tension and self-conflict, to find three grey and somewhat wispy
figures standing at my bedside. I was,
as might be imagined, completely taken up by them. Within a few minutes they had banished my own
sordid problem from my mind and replaced it with another and more intriguing
one. They were not Men from Mars, but
the Operators, a group in some ways stranger than Martians could be.
As O’Brien
points out, her interlopers are not extraterrestrials, but turn out to derive
their chief characteristics from a more mundane and immediate milieu; according
to Michael MacCoby in the Introduction, Barbara’s hallucinations “are not, however,
the gods and devils common to another age; they are the horrors of Organisation
Man; they are reactions to forces blocking attempts at creativity in work and
attempts to enjoy relationships of trust with others.” Published a couple of years before Operators, William H. Whyte’s The Organisation Man would, alongside
Sloan Wilson’s novel The Man in the Grey
Flannel Suit, become an iconic document of the American workplace in the
buttoned-down, conformist 50s. Both
works spoke to a sense that America, having won the war, was now drifting into
a torpor of materialistic, suburban mediocrity.
Whyte feared that the American workforce was trading the country’s
traditional values of individualism and self-sufficiency for a new collectivist
ethos centred around the corporation or company. The frontiersmen, the cowboys, and the rugged
GIs were drifting into memory, and gradually being replaced, Invasion of the Body Snatchers-style, by
a horde of indistinguishably suited company men and office drones, preoccupied
only by their salaries, pensions, and easy chairs by the television. As a side-note, it is interesting that the
increasing incursion of bureaucracy and office manners and dress-codes has had
such a pointed impact on American folklore and mythology. A decade earlier witnessed the emergence of
the Men In Black, one of the most enduring and intriguing of modern American
archetypes. The Man in Black was an
elusive type of the Organisation Man whose employers (and employer’s goals)
must remain utterly mysterious; their appearances and questions are, they
assure us, simply a matter of formality and routine. The archetype retains its vigour to this day,
serving the function of angel in one place, and devil in another. In the writings of John Keel, the Men In
Black emerge as peculiar, automaton-like beings, presenting us with an often
amateurish imitation of the human.
Perhaps there is some weird parallel between the Men in Black’s stilted
imitation of authentic humanity, and the fact that the organisation men and
women of the office-space were forced to adopt an imitation of something less than human, insofar as they were
forced to mould themselves to the regular, predictable, and emotionally
repressive dictates of office life.
If Whyte
feared the loss of the individualistic impulse in the corporate office milieu,
however, he was only half right. The impulse
towards a Darwinian type of competition seems to persist in most collectivist
institutions, where it simply moulds itself according to the behavioural norms
characteristic of the institution in question.
Since direct, physical confrontation was untenable to the modern,
civilised veneer presented by the office, a new species of competitive
behaviour had to evolve, one which was subtle rather than overt, and which
concentrated on the adroit manipulation and
control of other people, so that they became the apparent agents of their
own downfall. It is an exposure to this type of
institutionalized office sociopathology which precipitates Barbara O’Brien’s
mental breakdown, and provides her with the idea of the hook operator, the central
image of her subsequent schizophrenic fantasy:
But standards are
manufactured things. You don’t create
them, you accept them. And there are too
many men like Gordon and McDermott for me to feel now that all of them are
twisted. In a way, they have adapted
themselves superbly to a certain type of business environment. Both Gordon and McDermott cut the most direct
road they could find to where they wanted to go. That they both knifed a few men getting there
was totally unimportant to either of them.
‘Such men are immoral,’ people say of Hook Operators, and of course this
is true.
Behind
him stands the Hook Operator. Having
operated his hook successfully, the Hook Operator stands by with his other
instruments, the knife and the hatchet.
He watches the trashing man, speculating, considering. If necessary, he will move in and cut the
victim’s throat, or with his hatchet cleave through the victim’s head.
It is this Machiavellian
office environment which feeds directly into the extraordinary hallucinatory
world which Barbara is thrust into after her encounter with the Operators. She learns that the world is populated by two
distinct types of human being: Operators and Things. Operators differ from Things simply by virtue
of brain-chemistry. Operators are born
with a special variety of cells which they call “the battlement.” These cells give them a vastly heightened
psychic ability, which allows them to read and manipulate the minds of ordinary
humans, whom they christen “Things”:
Hinton sighed.
‘Things. Yes, of course. Think of the word with a capital initial, if
you like. It may help your ego a little
bit. All people like you are Things to
us – Things whose minds can be read and whose thoughts can be initiated and
whose actions can be motivated. Does
that surprize you? It goes on all the
time. There is some, but far less, free
will than you imagine. A Thing does what
some Operator wants it to do, only it remains under the impression that its
thoughts originate in its own mind.’
Here we find
the quintessence of extreme paranoia: the idea that our minds are subject to
invasion and manipulation by nefarious external agencies. These types of beliefs are a mainstay of
paranoid schizophrenia, and the cultural expression of the paranoid
schizophrenic tendency which we find at in the fringes of the conspiracy
community. The belief that our minds can
be controlled from afar often embodies a technological component, as was first
noted by Freud’s pupil Victor Tausk in his influential 1919 monograph On the Origin of the “Influencing Machine”
in Schizophrenia. Tausk’s case
studies describe a machine of “mystical nature” which is capable of producing
as well as removing thoughts and impressions in the patient’s brains by means
of “waves or rays or mysterious forces which the patient’s knowledge of physics
is inadequate to explain.” To invert
Clarke, any sufficiently advanced diabolism is indistinguishable from
technology. The great Outsider Artist
and schizophrenic visionary Richard Sharpe Shaver invented a dense mythology
around the idea of nefarious mind-manipulating technology, in which the
wielders of the influencing machine are found to be the “Abandoderos” (or Dero
for short, dero meaning “detrimental
robot”), an underground-dwelling race of degenerate fiends whom Shaver
describes as “fearfully anaemic jitterbugs, small, with pipestream arms and
legs, huge protruding eyes and wide, idiotically grinning mouths.” Proving that paranoia loves company, the
publication of Shaver’s ideas in the pulp Amazing
Stories prompted a flurry of letters which seemed to corroborate the
existence the Deros. Let’s not run paranoia
down too much; there is always some fire behind the wispy forms of mythological
smoke. Published a year before Operators and Things, Vince Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders shockingly exposed
the new psychological and sociological subtlety with which ad men were
attempting to read and manipulate the minds of the masses via technological
channels. In the late 70s, Jerry Mander
invoked the Influencing Machine in his polemic Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television: “Doubtless you have noticed that this
‘influencing machine’ sounds an awful lot like television….In any event, there
is no question that television does what the schizophrenic fantasy says it
does. It places in our minds images of
reality which are outside our experience.
The pictures come in the form of rays from a box. They cause changes in feeling and….utter
confusion as to what is real and what is not.”
To many hard-line Marxist critics of capitalist ideology, the earlier
quoted statement from the Operator Hinton is an apt enough description of
reality: ‘A Thing does what some Operator wants it to do, only it remains under
the impression that its thoughts originate in its own mind’.
In the form of
the Operators, Barbara O’Brien discovers the ultimate hidden persuaders, a
species of mundane, corporate Archon who are perhaps like a white-collar
division of Shaver’s monstrous Deros.
Part of the reason why O’Brien’s book didn’t cause the same furore of
true believers and fellow-travellers as the Shaver Mystery is probably that the
world of the Operators is largely a reflection of our own. Like us Things, Operators work for companies
(with sometimes Burroughsian names like The Western Boys); these organisations
broker “charters” on Things, charters being the exclusive right to operate, or
manipulate, Things. Operators then
artfully manipulate Things (and other Operators) in order to win “points.” One particularly cruel method by which points
are accrued is called The Game: a group of Operators take turns implanting
distressing thoughts in the mind of an unwitting Thing, and the Operator to
cause the most intense emotional distress wins the pot of points. Points are to Operators what money is to
Things:
‘What you’re overlooking is that a Thing can
be influenced chiefly because of its desire for money and power. An Operator’s security and self-esteem
revolve around Operator’s points just as a Thing’s revolves around money. With sufficient points, an Operator can do
anything in an Operator’s world. He can
be a great power. He can own an
organisation and buy the charters of hundreds of Things. He can be safe from other Operators. How does that make him more despicable than a
Thing? The hell of it is, Operators and
Things are motivated by similar desires.
We’re both in the soup, Operators and Things alike.’
In some
respects, O’Brien’s Operators resemble the Nova Mob postulated in William S.
Burroughs’ endlessly fascinating and infuriating Cut-Up Trilogy (The Soft Machine, The Ticket That Exploded, and Nova
Express.) Described by its author as
an attempt to create a “new mythology for the space age”, the trilogy posits a
Gnostic scenario in which planet earth is subject to the incursion of various
parasitic entities known collectively as the Nova Mob, who invade and
manipulate human beings in order to maximize conflict and suffering, on which
the Mob subsequently feed:
nova criminals are not
three dimensional organisms – (though they are quite definite organisms as we
shall see) – but they need three dimensional human agents in order to operate –
The point at which the criminal controller intersects a three-dimensional human
agent is known as “a coordinate point” – And if there is one thing that carries
over from one controller it is habit;
idiosyncrasies, vices, food preferences – (we were able to trace Hamburger Mary
through her fondness for peanut butter) – a gesture, a special look, that is to
say the style of the controller – A
chain smoker will always operate through chain smokers, an addict through
addicts – Now a single controller can operate through thousands of human
agents, but he must have a line of coordinate points – (The
Ticket That Exploded.)
Like
Burroughs’ Nova Mob, the denizens of Lynch’s Black Lodge in Twin Peaks, and the Reptilians of David
Icke’s popular conspiranoid mythos, O’Brien’s Operators subliminally manipulate
human beings in order to feed on their distress and alienation; like Burroughs’
hypostasis of absolute Control, they are controlled by their need to control. Habit patterns form an interesting component
of O’Brien’s scheme. In the language of
the Operators, Things’ habit patterns are referred to as “latticework.” In a grisly operation known as “dummetising”,
the latticework of a Thing can be removed and effectively reprogrammed by their
Operator:
‘It’s a process by
which most of a Thing’s latticework is removed and new latticework is allowed
to grow in,’ Nicky told me. ‘Latticework
is the growth in your mind which stores your habit patterns. It’s called latticework because it looks
something like the wooden latticework they use to support rosebushes. Once latticework is removed, a new
latticework will grow in quickly, but it may be a very different kind of
growth. The kind of habits you’ll
develop will depend on the Operators working on you while it’s growing in.’
What is perhaps
more intriguing is a point stressed by several of the Operators: once a Thing
has had its latticework removed, it is in a state of maximum pliability, and
can be controlled with ease by any Operator.
This is because Things (us, in other words) are constituted almost exclusively by their habit patterns;
their capacity to think spontaneously and independently of ingrained, automatic
mental patterns is extremely limited or non-existent. Hence, O’Brien’s hallucinatory controllers
echo the central insight of Gurdjieff and his initiated predecessors: we are asleep, and move through this life on
an autopilot or trance of calcified mental habits and routines. Ever abrasive towards the ego of the Things,
the following passage suggests just how
limited is our capacity for creative thought:
‘That’s a dummy with a
topknot,’ said Rink. ‘And whenever an
Operator runs into one of those, he knows that the Thing is not responsible for
anything that it does. It’s being controlled
entirely by an Operator. A Thing’s control
is in its habit patterns. When it has
nothing but its thinking ability left, the most feeble Operator can control it,
because Things can think only to a very limited degree.’
‘How limited?’
‘I’ll tell you this’,
Rink said with finality. ‘If it weren’t
for Operators, Things would still be wandering in and out of caves.’
That is a
rough outline of the complex world which O’Brien inhabits during the period of
her schizophrenic fugue. The Operators
tell her that she is the subject of an experiment, whereby a Thing will be
allowed to observe the normally secret activities of their Operators. For the next six months, she travels fitfully
across America on Greyhound buses, following the dictates of various bickering
and omnipresent Operators. Finally, after
many misadventures, she abruptly ceases to see and hear her interlopers, and
comes to the painful realization that they were all along only figments of her
unwell imagination. She makes a slow
progress back to a kind of normalcy, being at first perfectly stable, but
intellectually and emotionally inert. It
is in this interim period, however, that O’Brien experiences some of the books
most curious phenomena. The machinery of
her conscious mind (which she refers to as the
dry beach) is completely incapacitated by the trauma of her
schizophrenia. She is, however, aided at
times by her still acute unconscious mind, which she describes as sending waves
to the dry beach. These waves help her
out in small ways, alerting her to things she has forgotten about, helping her
in mundane situations that her exhausted conscious mind is not capable of
dealing with. This, however, is where
things start to get weird. In the
traumatic reorientation of her mental functioning, the powers of her
unconscious mind seem to have been temporarily heightened to a staggering
degree. She first writes a novel at
breakneck speed; but her conscious mind seems to have no input whatever into
what she is writing:
I would
sit at the typewriter, put my hands on the keys, and start in. I had almost no comprehension of what I was
writing and no memory whatever of what I had written, once I had closed the
typewriter. My fingers seemed to know
which keys to hit and that’s all there was to it. Apparently they were being guided by the
department below the sandy shore which contained the knowing waves and the
perfectly synchronised clock and which seemed completely capable of forming the
waves, operating the clock, and writing a novel without any assistance from the
dry beach.
More alarmingly,
her unconscious mind seems to be temporarily experiencing a series of wild
talents which she refers to as Something. These abilities appear to include telepathy
and precognition; she experiences a “four day period of growing apprehension,
knowing before people spoke what they would say, knowing, before they turned
corners and appeared, that they were coming.”
Finally, Something compels her to go to Los Vegas:
Something kept me
rooted at one wheel and Something urged me violently to play a certain number
at a certain time. I played a dollar
chip and won. I waited, rooted, got
another strong urge, played, won again.
I played six times, won six times, and found myself with a purse full of
money.
Then Something
too departs from her mental functioning, and she returns gradually to a
relatively normative mental health. The
whole experience spurs O’Brien to embark on a fascinating series of
speculations regarding the nature of inspiration, creativity, and the
unconscious, which reminds me frequently of the theories underpinning Julian
Jaynes’ mind-bending 1976 masterpiece The
Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. In the conclusion of this essay, I’m
going to consider Operators and Things
in relation to Jaynes’ controversial theories.
Conclusion: The Subterranean Craftsman.
Psychology
does not know much about creativity.
Freud analyses Dostoevsky as a neurotic, but he admits ‘Before the
problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms.’ In a similar way one can explain William
Blake’s hallucinations and his denunciation of the Royal Academy’s Hook
Operators, but the music of Blake’s words, the form of their content, and the
fact of creativity, rather than stagnation, remain an awesome mystery.
Michael
MacCoby, Operators and Things,
Introduction.
The waves were far more clever
than the dry beach.
Barbara
O’Brien, Operators and Things.
It
is surely a peculiar kind of book which can count among its admirers Daniel
Dennett at one end of the spectrum, and Philip K. Dick, William Burroughs, Alan
Moore, Robert Anton Wilson, and Grant Morrison at the other extreme. The
Origin is surely the only such book.
To Dennett, its appeal probably lies largely in the fact that it offers
a neurological explanation for the emergence of religion – but the book has
also been name-checked by just about every significant countercultural writer
of the modern period because it remains one of the boldest and most elegantly
expressed speculations on the nature of human consciousness and history ever
produced. It is eminently a book for
what used to be called “heads” - adventurous thinkers whose fondness for
mind-blowing drugs is merely a subset of a deeper fascination with the nature
of consciousness, and an equal predilection for mind-blowing ideas. Jaynes begins his odyssey by asking: how many
of the things which we tend to associate with consciousness actually
necessitate the use of conscious thought?
Following the testimonies of various artists, mathematicians, and
scientists, Jaynes concludes that surprisingly few actually do. The best way to begin to think about this
would be with the example of trying to remember something. You rack your conscious mind – it’s on the
tip of your tongue – but the required information just won’t come. Then, at some point, maybe a moment later,
maybe a day, the answer just pops effortlessly into your mind. Something – not your stumbling, bumbling
conscious recall - has gone into the files and retrieved the data. Jaynes argues that precisely the same process
occurs with mental tasks of far
greater complexity. For the scientist or
the mathematician, there is a process of conscious priming, whereby a problem
is kicked around in the conscious mind.
The conscious mind exerts itself considerably, before finally reaching
an impasse – the problem appears intractable.
Then sometime later, in the shower, shaving, waiting for the bus, when
the conscious mind is thinking about something completely different – wham, Eureka, the solution surges forth,
fully-formed and unbidden. Again,
Something (to borrow O’Brien’s capitalization) – not the scientist’s stumbling,
bumbling conscious problem-solving
capacity – has somehow put all the pieces of the jigsaw together, without the
scientist even being aware of it. It’s
like that peculiar phenomenon (or subjective impression) recorded by many who
have dabbled casually in fishing: you only hook the fish as soon as you’ve
stopped thinking about hooking a fish.
Barbara
O’Brien’s experience of rapidly writing a coherent novel with no apparent input
from her conscious mind prompts her to consider the same mysterious properties
of inspiration and creativity. She also
finds that the writer, when he or she is working at their optimum ability,
always feels as though Something else has gotten into the driver’s seat:
Other writers who
produced work of a higher calibre said almost exactly the same thing. ‘The story wrote itself,’ was the phrase
usually used to describe the birth of some story for which the writer had
become best known. Attempting to explain
what was happening to them while they were in the flush of creation, writers
drew revealing pictures. ‘I felt like a
receiving station for a programme coming in.’
‘It flooded my mind like a faucet being turned on.’ (Operators
and Things)
From these
tentative early speculations, Jaynes arrives at a stunning hypothesis: that up
until about three thousand years ago, human beings did not possess full self
and meta-consciousness, but rather existed in a mental condition which Jaynes
christened “bicameralism” (“two-chamberedness”). This effectively meant experiencing the two
working hemispheres of the brain as separate entities – that is that the brain
worked in a largely unconscious manner according the same type of habit
patterns which the other animals exhibit (and which the Operators refer to as
“latticework”). However, when bicameral
man encountered a problem which the habitual latticework was incapable of
coping with, the right hemisphere produced a solution which the left then
perceived as an auditory command coming from an external source. That is,
the left hemisphere perceived it’s smarter, problem-solving, big picture
grokking right hemisphere as something wholly other from itself – and as Something whose voice must be obeyed. (Recall the Operator Rink’s assertion to
Barbara O’Brien: ‘I tell you this. If it weren’t
for Operators, Things would still be wandering in and out of caves.’) Eventually, the bicameral mind brakes down,
the hemispheres become – to a large degree – experientially and conceptually
united, and modern self and meta-self-consciousness is born. But from that initial experience of the
smarter, gestalt-comprehending right hemisphere as a commanding and external
presence, emerged all our conceptions – religious and societal - of the higher authority which must be obeyed:
all our gods, all our chieftains and god-kings, all our ancestral spirits, all
our mediumistic channels, all our Hidden Chiefs, Ascended Masters, and
Benevolent Space Brothers. Jaynes posits
that all human cultural history – right up to the present day deification of
the physical sciences – is haunted by a nostalgia for the bicameral mind, and
for the immeasurable comfort of yielding to that apparently external voice of absolute
authority and wisdom.
It seems to me
to that while Jaynes’ theory may not be completely (or even substantially)
correct, he was still most definitely on
to something. It does often feel as
though a radical alteration of some kind occurred to to our consciousness from
which we have not quite recovered; that some fissure opened up which has made
us, uniquely in the animal kingdom, of two distinct and often inharmonious minds,
the uneasy denizens of two distinct worlds.
Ian Gilchrist, exploring and extending similar ideas to Jaynes in his
book The Master and His Emissary: The
Divided Brain and the Making of the Modern World, suggests that “many of
the disputes about the nature of the human world can be illuminated by an
understanding that there are two fundamentally different ‘versions’ delivered to
us by the two hemispheres, both of which can have a ring of authenticity about
them, and both of which are hugely valuable; but they stand in opposition to
one another, and need to be kept apart from one another – hence the bihemspheric
structure of the brain.” To those sceptical
of over-literal, pop psychological treatments of the hemispheres, Gilchrist acknowledges
that his division of specific modes of apprehending the world according to the
left and right hemispheres may ultimately be a metaphor, albeit one which
refers to real attributes of human consciousness. (Gilchrist’s title – The Master and his Emissary
- can be easily mapped on to O’Brien’s Operator/Thing dichotomy.)
However one
feels about Jaynes’ theory of bicameralism, Operators
and Things makes for a fascinating illustration of many of its
tenants. Discussing the fantasies of schizophrenics,
O’Brien notes that the common feature of schizophrenic interlopers – whether diabolical,
extraterrestrial, or technological – is that of absolute, unquestionable authority:
I should like to note, at this point, that
schizophrenics, long before writers dreamed up science fiction, had – as they
still have – a consistent way of developing mental worlds filled with Men from
Mars, devils, death ray experts, and other fanciful characters.
Regardless of their
individuality, they seem to have certain characteristics in common: they are
figures of authority who can command with considerably expectation that the dry
beach will obey; they are superhuman and beyond the powers of human authorities
who might interfere, such as policemen and doctors. Once they appear, the dry beach speedily gets
the general drift: either you do what these characters say, or else, for no
other human can help you.
The crucial
lesson which O’Brien learns in the course of her experience is that the unconscious
(or silent right hemisphere, or whichever metaphor you prefer), rather than
being the broiling sea of atavistic and irrational impulse which Freud
imagined, is in fact a creative and immeasurably smart entity. O’Brien
presents her runaway unconscious most frequently as a kind of effortless master
artist:
In most cases of
schizophrenia, however, the unconscious appears to prefer not the techniques of
the actor, but those of the director. It
does not create a new personality, but instead stages a play. The major difference is that the conscious
mind is permitted to remain, an audience of one sitting lonely in the theatre,
watching a drama on which it cannot walk out.
Without stopping for a
deep breath, it gets its Martian, or whatever, going. With speed and apparent purposefulness, it
escorts the conscious mind to a box seat, makes it comfortable, and projects
the shape or shapes it has created, and the voice or voices it has chosen.
Many of the
lessons O’Brien derives from her traumatic experience are not flattering to the
ego. The dry beach of daylight self-consciousness
is a tiny spit of sand in a vast ocean of which it has only the most limited
and fleeting knowledge; the ego, the would-be controller of its world, is a
mere plaything in the hands of a variety of Operators who can see right through
it at a glance. All of these things O’Brien learns obliquely through
a kind of six-month Twilight Zone
mental radio play. However, the picture
is not entirely bleak. Connected somehow
with the dangers of extreme loss of control, trauma, and madness, are the
hidden wellsprings of creativity, of almost supernatural-seeming intuition, of
all the higher potentialities of the mind; potentialities whose outer limit, O’Brien
intriguingly suggests, we can scarcely conceptualize: “Possibly, conscious man knows so little
about the odd talents, that there is no language or concept by which the
unconsciousness can explain its unusual processes.” Of course, in the commonality of the
delusion, the dream, and the painted canvas or flickering cinema screen, art
itself remains the primary candidate for this difficult and ongoing exchange.
The vintage Operators and Things cover is from THE CHISELER - A THING TO REMEMBER
The vintage Operators and Things cover is from THE CHISELER - A THING TO REMEMBER
The picture of the suburbs is from Electric Sunshine.